Volume 2
Issue 2 Summer
Summer 1972

Through a Glass Darkly: The Law of Standing to Challenge
Governmental Action in New Mexico or All You Wanted to Know
About Standing and Were Afraid to Ask
Albert E. Utton

Recommended Citation
Albert E. Utton, Through a Glass Darkly: The Law of Standing to Challenge Governmental Action in New
Mexico or All You Wanted to Know About Standing and Were Afraid to Ask, 2 N.M. L. Rev. 171 (1972).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol2/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: THE LAW
OF STANDING TO CHALLENGE GOVERNMENTAL
ACTION IN NEW MEXICO
or

ALL YOU WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT
STANDING AND WERE AFRAID TO ASK
ALBERT E. UTTONt
The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized the federal law of
standing as a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction."'

Kenneth Culp Davis says the federal law of standing "is so cluttered
and confused that almost every proposition has some exception....

"2 and pungently adds it "has long been too complex." 3

One can safely say the same of New Mexico. The New Mexico law of
standing is complicated and confusing. Neither courts nor lawyers are
able confidently to negotiate its erratic currents. Likewise the law of
standing in New Mexico "has long been too complex."
The federal law of standing has recently been considerably
clarified by three landmark cases-two relating to standing to
challenge governmental actions other than public expenditures, and
the third completing the standing spectrum by relating to challenges
to public expenditures. With this comprehensive revision of the federal law of standing, now is an appropriate juncture for evaluating
the New Mexico law of standing with a view to anticipating and
suggesting the course of its future development and hopefully its
clarification and simplification.
CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT ACTIONS OTHER THAN
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
The difficulties federal courts have had in formulating the law of
standing is illustrated particularly well in those cases in which the
one seeking standing was an economically injured competitor. The
formulation was expressed in the seminal case of Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. T. V.A.,' that one is without standing unless "the right
invaded is a legal right. . .

."

This led courts to decide at the pre-

liminary standing stage the question of whether legal rights were
invaded. The case of Assn. of Data ProcessingService Organization v.
tProfessor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. B.A., University of New
Mexico, 1953; M.A. (Juris) (Oxon.), 1959.
1. United States ex reL Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
2. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 (1968).
3. Davis, The LiberalizedLaw of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970).
4. 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939).
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Camp' liberalized the federal law of standing by expressly overruling
Tennessee Electric and changing the judicial inquiry from "were legal
rights invaded" to "whether the interest sought to be protected ... is
arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 6 This much
more preliminary language focuses on the threshold nature of the
standing decision and leaves the decision of whether the plaintiff was
in fact unlawfully injured or a legal right in fact invaded to be
decided after argument on the merits. As the Supreme Court said in
overruling Tennessee Electric, "the 'legal interest' test goes to the
merits. The question of standing is different." 7
The New Mexico phraseology has been an almost direct copy of
that of Tennessee Electric v. T. V.A. The New Mexico Court in
R'uidoso State Bank v. Brumlow8 said, "The true test is whether
appellant's legal rights have been invaded. . ."' thus often leading
the New Mexico courts, just as the federal courts, to decide the
merits of the case when it decided the threshold question of standing
involving economic competitors. The Data Processing case has improved the federal law of standing, whereas New Mexico is left with
the federally overruled Tennessee Electric language.
In developing the New Mexico law of standing in view of the Data
Processing decision, there are at least four possible alternative positions from which the New Mexico court might select:
1. It might uphold the "legal right" formulation of Ruidoso State
Bank and thereby maintain the status quo;' o
2. It might, with some liberal interpretation of precedents, take
the position that the New Mexico law is congruent with the
Data Processing standards or at least not inconsistent with
them and thereby simply refine the New Mexico phraseology
to conform with that of Data Processing;
3. The New Mexico court could follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
example and expressly overrule the Ruidoso State Bank "legal
right" test and adopt the Data Processing standards;
4. It could overrule Ruidoso State Bank, but rather than adopt
the Data Processing standards verbatim, could establish an
improved formulation avoiding some of the complexities of the
Data Processingstandard which hindsight has revealed.
This fourth alternative is the course this paper will propose with
5. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
6. Id. at 153.
7. Id.
8. 81 N.M. 379, 467 P.2d 395 (1970).
9. Id. at 381, 467 P.2d at 397.
10. This, with all deference, is not a status one should quo about.
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the object of developing a single, simplified standard for determining
standing in cases seeking to challenge governmental actions other
than public expenditures.
SIMILARITY BETWEEN NEW MEXICO AND DATA PROCESSING
There is support for concluding that there is congruence in a
general way between the New Mexico law of standing and the requirements established by Data Processing. Data Processing established a twofold test: Is there "injury in fact, economic or otherwise" to the complainant, and, is the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."' I
A survey of the New Mexico decisions reveals some similarity
between the New Mexico requirements for standing to challenge
governmental actions other than public expenditures and the Data
Processing requirements although, assuredly, there are cases which do
not seem to fit and others which require considerable elasticity in the
translation process.
A. New Mexico: Injury in Fact, Economic or Otherwise
The general rule in New Mexico echoes the first Data Processing
criterion. In most cases to have standing a New Mexico complainant
must have a direct personal interest-he must be personally injured in
fact. Although the courts in New Mexico have had as much trouble
as those in other jurisdictions in attempting to fashion a coherent
theory of standing, the requirement of injury in fact has stood
robustly firm. The cases establish that a person will not have standing
just because he is a citizen, or a resident, or a taxpayer, or a property
owner, or a competitor, or a public officer, or a combination of all of
these. The complainant must demonstrate as well that he has been
injured in fact, economically or otherwise.
For example, in Kuhn v. Burroughs' 2 the plaintiffs as citizens and
taxpayers brought suit against the State, alleging that the Bureau of
Revenue which was collecting sales tax for the City of Albuquerque
was charging the maximum amount allowed by law for the expense
of administration without regard to the actual cost of administration.
The court denied standing saying, "In order to bring an action the
plaintiffs must have an interest in the subject matter of the suit
which gives them standing to sue. . . ,,' 3 and citing Asplund v.
11. 397 U.S. 153 (1970).
12. 66 N.M. 61, 342, P.2d 1086 (1959).
13. Id at 63, 342 P.2d at 1087.
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Hannett'" said, "a taxpayer does not have a sufficient interest or
standing to bring suit against the state."' I
In State ex rel. Overton v. New Mexico State Tax Commission' 6
the Los Alamos county assessor sought, by a declaratory judgment,
to challenge the constitutionality of the veterans' real and personal
property tax exemption statute. He was denied standing because "a
public officer as such does not have an interest as would entitle him
to question the constitutionality of a statute. . . .'" '
In Overton IP 8 the court denied standing for a writ of mandamus
because the plaintiff "pleads no facts which show an injury ... " 9
and to use plaintiff's words, he was not saved "from the legal status
of an officious dogooder with no standing to sue."'2 0
In Griggs v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Colfax County,'
the plaintiffs were denied standing to challenge a resolution of the
board relating to a bond issue because they were "men who
profess. . . no prospective loss or injury of the bonds being
issued ... "2 2
In Gallegos v. Conroy, 2 although the court rather fully discussed
the merits of the case, it did not allow the plaintiff to enjoin the
building of a "Y" in the highway passing through Los Lunas which
he alleged would lead to confusion of traffic and danger to vehicles
and life because he pleaded no facts "indicating the manner in which
he would be damaged...."I'
In Stoval v. Vesely, 2" taxpayers and citizens were denied standing
to enjoin the sale of certain public lands because they had no personal stake in the action-they were "complete strangers" 2 to the
governmental action.
In Tomlin v. Town of Las Cruces,2" a tourist camp owner attempted to enjoin the rerouting of Highway 80 which he alleged
would "injuriously affect the public in very materially increasing the
distance to be travelled..., and in introducing four sharp turns
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074 (1926).
Kuhn v. Burroughs, 66 N.M. 61, 63, 342 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1959).
81 N.M. 28, 462 P.2d 613 (1969).
Id. at 616, 462 P.2d at 616.
80 N.M. 780, 461 P.2d 913 (1969).
Id. at 783,461 P.2d at 916.
Id. at 783, 461 P.2d at 916.
39 N.M. 102, 41 P.2d 277 (1935).
Id. at 105, 41 P.2d at 279.
38 N.M. 154, 29 P.2d 334 (1934).
Id. at 155, 29 P.2d at 335.
38 N.M. 415, 34 P.2d 862 (1934).
Id. at 419, 34 P.2d at 865.
38 N.M. 247, 31 P.2d 258 (1934).
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instead of a straight road ...."2 ' Again, standing was denied because
a private individual to have standing must suffer some injury which
"is distinct from that of the public." 2 9
This requirement of injury in fact meets the case or controversy
requirement that Article III of the U.S. Constitution imposed on the
federal courts. The New Mexico cases speak of the necessity of a
"direct interest, pecuniary or otherwise."' I Thus, as was said in
Flast v. Cohen, "the emphasis ...is on ...a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy." 3" This personal stake goes to assure
there will be "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions," 3 2 the principal concern here being that
the question is framed so as to be "capable of judicial resolution." '
So New Mexico like the federal rule requires personal injury in
fact. The injury, however, may be slight as in the case of Johnson v.
Greiner3 where the plaintiff successfully gained access to the courts
to challenge a 25 cent tax he paid to the Chaves County Clerk for
filing a chattel mortgage. And so it should be. As James Madison said
regarding an establishment of religion question, "The same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of only one establishment may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases whatever."3 s
B. New Mexico: Zone of Interests to be Protected
The second :half of the federal formulation grants standing where
there has been injury in fact "if the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute as constitutional guarantee in
question." 3 6
In a general way it might be suggested that the New Mexico decisions are compatible with the second prong of DataProcessing, if one
makes a liberal translation of the New Mexico language into the
federal formulation. Also, one must add the important caveat that
the second Data Processing standard is complex, and is an open
28. Id at 248, 31 P.2d at 259.
29. Id. at 250, 31 P.2d at 260.
30. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 164, 477 P.2d 602
(1970).
31. 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
33. Davis, supra note 2, at 607.
34. 44 N.M. 230, 101 P.2d 183 (1940).
35. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
36. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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invitation to disagree over what interests were intended to be "protected or regulated" by the relevant statutory or constitutional provision. 3 " Because of this "litigation prone" complexity of the second
half of Data Processing, this paper will later argue that New Mexico
in clarifying its law of standing should resist taking the half-way step
of Data Processing. Nonetheless, it might be argued that there is
some general compatibility between the second half of Data
Processing and the more recent formulations of the New Mexico
court that have arisen in cases in which economic competitors sought
standing to challenge governmental action.
In attempting to fashion a single doctrine for determining standing
to challenge governmental actions other than public expenditures,
the situation of the economically injured competitor has presented
the courts with a special case. The courts have become entangled in
the seemingly reasonable proposition that since one has no right to
be free from competition, a competitor has no standing to challenge
a governmental decision; for example the licensing of a competitor,
which injures the complainant economically. For example, Tennessee
Electric, the leading case until overruled, said one is not entitled to
standing unless "the right invaded is a legal right ...."I 8 Since competition is legal, then new competition does not invade a legal right.
What could be more logical? The problem is that the formulation is
too general. The correct statement should be "lawful" competition is
legal and no one has a right to be free from "lawful" competition;
but the very lawfulness of the competition often is the issue which
the person seeking standing wants the courts to resolve. Competition
in general is lawful, but if the government agency, for example, acted
unlawfully in granting a license to a competitor, then the competition is unlawful. However, if the courts deny standing because
competition in general is lawful, it decides the merits of the case
without hearing argument on whether in fact this particular competition is lawful.
Data Processing has expressly overruled this "legal right" test
of
Tennessee Electric for federal standing. New Mexico meanwhile still
seems to be caught in the embrace of the Tennessee Electric "legal
right" approach. The court in the Ruidoso State Bank and Hubbard
cases recently reiterated the Tennessee Electric type formulation in
saying, "The true test is whether the appellant's legal rights have
been invaded ... ," and went on to say, "One whose only injury will
result from lawful competition suffers no legal wrong. 9
"3

37. Davis, supra note 3, at 462.
38. 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
39. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 164, 165, 477 P.2d
602, 603 (1970).
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However, the use of the phrase "lawful competition" may hold
out some hope for the future because reason would indicate that the
court's position should not be interpreted to stand for the proposition that because the complainant's injury is financial he has no
standing to challenge "unlawful" competition.4 0 Otherwise one
would have to ask if this person who is in fact injured cannot
challenge unlawful governmental action, who then can?
In addition, if the very thing the complainant is challenging in the
lawfulness of governmental action, to deny standing by saying the
action complained of is lawful is to decide the case on the merits
without allowing argument on the merits. If the action complained
of is arguably unlawful, then a complaining party who is injured in
fact should be allowed to argue the merits before the court and not
have access to judicial determination barred at the threshold of the
courthouse.
After evaluating the recent decisions of the New Mexico court, it
must be concluded that the formulation that "one whose only injury
will result from lawful competition suffers no legal wrong," although
it sounds acceptable enough, goes too far and says too much. It leads
the court into deciding the central question of the lawfulness of
government action at the preliminary standing stage and subtly but
insidiously may lead the courts to view less seriously injury which is
caused by economic competition.
Such seems to be the case in New Mexico; the New Mexico court
seems to look the other way at the first whiff of economic competition. With almost pavlovian certainty, it has steadfastly denied
standing if the injury was caused by business competition-in Green
v. Town of Gallup, it was held that "financial loss to plaintiff... was
for standing. In Ruidoso State Bank the

not alone ground. .

. .""

court said, "[WIe

[have] held that profits or commercial advan-

tages... were too elusive and uncertain ...to maintain mandamus
proceedings ....""2 In that same case the court elaborated by

saying: "One enjoying an advantage over his competitors has been
held to have no standing to seek review of an administrative order
which destroys this advantage." '4 3 In HubbardBroadcasting, Inc. v.
City of Albuquerque14 the court appears to have almost summarily
dismissed the thought of granting standing once the word competi40. However, there is some awkward language in Tomlin v. Town of Las Cruces: "It is
not enough that plaintiffs establish that defendant committed a wong... .A violation of
some positive legal right of plaintiffs must be shown." 38 N.M. 247, 250, 31 P.2d 258, 260
(1934).
41. 46 N.M. 71, 75, 120 P.2d 619, 621 (1941).
42. 81 N.M. 379, 381, 467 P.2d 395, 397 (1970).
43. Id. at 380, 467 P.2d at 396.
44. 82 N.M. 164,477 P.2d 602 (1970) (emphasis added).
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tion was uttered. The court rhetorically raises the question, "Does
Hubbard have standing to maintain this action?" and then responds
confidently and firmly, "This question is answered in the negative
for the following reasons. Hubbard contends and admits that the
main issues here are competition with a rival business, economic loss
of revenue and resulting profits, loss of good will, and 'ghosting.'

Such contentions are without merit ....

"I I One can only reflect on

the irony of the court explicitly deciding on the merits while denying
the opportunity to the complainants to argue the merits and the
opportunity to hear those arguments itself. In this case Hubbard
sought a declaratory judgment that the city did not have authority to
grant a franchise to use city streets for a cable television system. The
court denied the plaintiff standing saying competition is lawful when
the very lawfulness of the competition was what the plaintiff sought
to argue on its merits. The court summarily stated that "cable television per se is not illegal." In so doing, it allowed itself to be confused by a muddled piece of analysis. It said, "Whether or not the
City of Albuquerque acted ultra vires is a question quite apart and
distinct from whether GenCoE is a lawful competitor." The court
went on to say, "Cable television is not per se illegal .... ,46 No one
would seriously argue that it is per se illegal, just as operating a dry
cleaning plant is not per se illegal; but if a dry cleaning establishment
does not have a properly issued license it cannot be operating legally.
Therefore, just because cable T.V. is not per se illegal does not
answer the question of whether GenCoE was legally authorized to
operate its business. This question is one which should have been
decided on its merits after appropriate argument. It is not a question
which should have been peremptorily dismissed on the threshold
decision on standing, and in fact at the trial level, Judge Larazolo did
hear the question on its merits and decided that GenCoE was not
legally authorized to operate in Albuquerque.
It might be possible to suggest that the actual language of the New
Mexico economic competition cases is such that by liberal interpretation the results and criteria of Data Processing could be attained
without expressly overruling extant precedents, thereby escaping the
shackles of the Tennessee Electric legacy.4 '
45. Id. at 165, 477 P.2d 603.
46. Id. at 166, 477 P.2d 604.
47. However, in the interest of clarifying and simplifying the New Mexico law
of
standing, it would be desirable for the New Mexico court to expressly rearticulate
the
criteria for standing, and in so doing it should improve on Data Processing in
light of
experience by avoiding the complexities of the second of the two Data Processing
requirements as this paper will later argue. See Davis, supra note 3, at 455, who demonstrates
how
the Supreme Court itself was immediately confused by its own standards.
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Data Processing requires injury in fact, and that the interest sought
to be protected be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by some statute or constitutional guarantee. The language of
New Mexico cases relating to economic competition is not absolutely
inconsistent with this approach. In Ruidoso State Bank the court
said, "an aggrieved party ... is one having an interest recognized by

law... [one might read "within the zone of interests to be pro4
tected"] which is injuriously affected [read "injured in fact"]."

8

Later the court said, "The true test is whether appellant's legal
rights have been invaded, not merely whether he has suffered any
actual pecuniary loss. .

. .""

As in Data Processing mere pecuniary

loss ("injury in fact") is not enough by itself; in addition the interest
to be protected (legal rights invaded) must arguably be within the
zone intended to be protected or regulated by law (statutory or
constitutional).' 0
So the line of inquiry followed by the courts in competition cases
could perhaps be interpreted as being consistent with the twopronged approach of Data Processing. The fact. that economic
competition is involved need not and should not ipso facto mean a
negative answer to the question of standing. Thus, a rather elastic
interpretation could perhaps be used to reform the New Mexico
standing law, but it would be better for the New Mexico courts to
clearly rephrase the New Mexico law of standing.
Also, the Hubbard case did in fact explicitly consider the Data
Processing criteria for determining standing; whether the result
reached in the particular case was correct or incorrect, Hubbard has
the potential for being cited as precedent for the adoption of the
Data Processing criteria in determining questions of standing in New
Mexico. The court, in discussing Data Processing, said the U.S.
Supreme Court found a statutory provision in Data Processingwhich
"created a protectable zone of interest sufficient for standing pur48. See discussion at note 42 supra.
49. Id.
50. There is also some helpful language in Harriet v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738
(1958). In that case, the complainants sought to enjoin the consolidation of certain school
districts in Socorro County and were granted standing. The court used language which is
similar to that of Data Processing. The court upon "a careful reading" of the declaratory
judgment act found that "an injured party has standing to sue under a declaratory judgment
act on any genuine question involving the constitutionality or construction of a statute."
(Emphasis added.) Id at 387, 320 P.2d at 741 (1958). Thus, the court required first a
showing of injury in fact and second its phrase "genuine question" is reminiscent of the
Data Processing "arguably within the zone of protected interests." The "genuine question"
language requires that at the threshold point of standing the complainant convince the court
that his complaint is not capricious but is arguably serious enough to be heard on the merits.
Thus by using language that reflects the threshold nature of the standing decision it avoids
the finality of the Ruidoso language.
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poses.. ." but "the ordinances before this court do not present a
comparable situation," ' ' i.e., the interests the plaintiffs sought to
protect were not arguably within the zone of interests intended to be
protected by the ordinances.
Whether one agrees with this conclusion or not is not the point.
What could be important is that the court at least purported to
follow the line of inquiry laid down in Data Processing, even if not
very vigorously.5 2
Thus, it might be asserted that, as in Data Processing, the New
Mexico court imposes two requirements for standing-injury in fact
plus the invasion of a legal interest. There is an important difference,
however, that makes the Data Processing language far superior to
that in Ruidoso State Bank-the use of the simple word "arguably."
Data Processing focuses on the preliminary nature of the standing
determination by asking whether the interest is "arguably within the
zone of interest" rather than "were legal rights invaded" in fact. This
latter determination is one which should be made after full argument
on the merits 'ather than at the threshold standing stage and the
"legal rights" language is too much a copy of the discredited language of Tennessee Electric with its patina of interpretation. As the
U.S. Supreme Court in Data Processing said, the existence or nonexistence of a "legal interest" or "legal right" (to use the Ruidoso
language) "is a matter quite distinct from the problem of
standing."' 3
51. Hubbard v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 164, 167, 477 P.2d 602, 605 (1970).
52. In fairness, it must be said that the court does not appear to have made a very serious
effort in following the "zone of interests" inquiry. It gave no more than a paragraph to its
analysis and dismissed the whole inquiry in a one-sentence conclusion. Its interest seemed to
lie elsewhere, and once the fact that competition and economic injury were "admitted," its
decision seemed a foregone conclusion. It had little heart for any analysis of whether the
relevant law arguably established a zone of interests intended to be protected. Even the
question of what was the relevant law was not explained. The court assumed that the
ordinances were the relevant laws to examine to see if they created a zone of protected
interests within which the plaintiff could bring himself; this is a questionable assumption on
the part of the court. It is much more likely that the proper focus of inquiry should have
been the city charter or perhaps relevant enabling legislation which would relate to the
critical question of whether the city acted ultra vires, or, alternately, the most obvious
legislation which should have been considered in the light of Data Processing was the statute
cited to the court by the plaintiffs-the New Mexico Declaratory Judgment Statute [N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 22-6-1 (1953)] which, on its face explicitly grants standing to "any interested
party."
53. See discussion at note 7 supra. The court in Ruidoso was echoing the language of
Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074 (1926), where the court said, "The injury
must consist.., in the invasion of some right of the complaining party..."Id. at 651. The
individual to have standing "must have legal equitable rights to be protected." Id. at 664. It
should be noted that in Associated Industries the plaintiffs had a direct personal interest as
consumers of coal challenging orders increasing the price of coal. For further discussion, see
K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 428 (3d ed. 1972).
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PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Although at this juncture it can perhaps be suggested that there is
some similarity between New Mexico case law and the Data Processing decision, there is another factor operating in New Mexicojudicial discretion. The New Mexico court in its discretion will grant
standing quite apart from the requirements enumerated in Ruidoso
State Bank, if it thinks the question important enough. The court has
consistently resisted the idea of a "private attorney general" which
would give private individuals standing to enforce or "to vindicate to
the public interest" as the U.S. Supreme Court said in Associated
Industries v. Ikes. s' In that case the court said persons authorized
under the relevant statute to vindicate the public interest are, so to
speak, private attorneys general. New Mexico decisions have generally required a direct personal interest, i.e., injury in fact to the one
seeking standing consistent with Data Processing.
In Tomlin v. Town of Las Cruces, the court held that a private
individual must suffer "some injury ... which . . . is distinct from
that of the public.., the injury .. . must consist in the invasion of

some right of the complaining party."" In Padilla v. Franklin, the
court said the complainant must have a "direct interest different
from the public as a whole."5 6 In other words, the general rule is no
private attorneys general; there must be a "direct personal interest."
However, if the New Mexico court considers the question important enough, it will in the exercise of its discretion grant standing to
a private citizen to vindicate the public interest. The 1968 case of
State ex rel. Castillo v. N.M. State Tax Commission"' and the 1965
case of State ex rel. Gomez v. Campbell" s are the landmark decisions
establishing this concept. There are a number of earlier cases which
play a role in this development, and the case of Hutchison v.
Gonzales' 9 is one of the key earlier decisions. The plaintiff, a
54. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
55. 38 N.M. 247, 249, 31 P. 258, 260 (1934).
56. 70 N.M. 243, 244, 372 P.2d 820, 84 (1962). The similarity of the approach and
language of the New Mexico court is striking. In a decision in which the petitioner, a doctor,
sought to challenge a decision not to change a public poster about diptheria vaccination, the
Conseil d'Etat denied standing because a petitioner ". . . who has based his petition on his
position as a citizen and could not in the circumstances rely on any other interest, does not

show that he has a direct personal interest in having the challenged act set aside." B.
Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common Law World 181 (1954) My thanks
to Tom Stribling, The University of New Mexico School of Law, for this comparison.
57. 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850 (1968). The French position again parallels the New
Mexico law. Although the Conseil d'Etat denies standing unless the plaintiff suffers a direct
personal injury, it has nonetheless granted standing if thought the action would serve the
public good. Schwartz, supra note 56, at 180.
58. 75 N.M. 86, 400 P.2d 956 (1965).
59. 41 N.M. 474, 71 P.2d 140 (1937).
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citizen, resident and qualified elector, sought by an original writ of
mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to publish proposed
constitutional amendments as required by Article 19 of the New
Mexico Constitution. The court had no hesitation when it said,
"Believing as we do that the plaintiff is a person 'beneficially interested' in his own behalf and that the cause of action which he
asserts is of common or general interest .".6

0

he has standing.

In a landowner or taxpayer case in which the routing of a highway
or the assessment of taxes was challenged, the plaintiff would have
been called an intermeddling stranger. The court probably would
have refused to hear the case and paraphrased the language of
Asplund v. Hannett by saying, "It does not appear that the plaintiff
will be affected in any other manner than any other qualified elector
of the state." However, Hutchison was an original proceeding in
mandamus, and the court granted standing under the rules governing
the court's original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus
against state officers and agencies. The court took note of the rule
that in such cases it should decline jurisdiction in "cases brought at
the instance of a private suitor" except where the case is "publici
juris; that is a case which affects sovereignty of the state... or the
liberties of its people."'
The court went on to quote an earlier case that, "it is the general
rule that mandamus may be issued to enforce the performance of a
public duty by public officers, upon application of any citizen whose
rights are affected in common with those of the public. Such person
is 'beneficially interested' in the enforcement of the laws." 6 2 It thus
appears that mandamus requirements for standing would be diametrically opposite to those in other cases. In mandamus proceedings
standing would be given to enforce public rights if those rights were
affected "in common with those of the public" whereas in other
proceedings, such as where injunctive relief was sought, standing
would not be granted if the applicant was affected in common with
the public in general. It might then have been suggested that a
"public action" brought by a private party was only possible in
mandamus or quo warranto proceedings.
However, in 1965 in the case of State ex rel. Gomez v. Campbell, 6 3 the court reviewed both the Hutchison decision, which was a
mandamus proceeding and Asplund v. Hannett6 4 in which an in60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 494, 71 P.2d 140 (1937).
Id. at 492, 71 P.2d at 151.

Id.
75 N.M. 86, 400 P.2d 956 (1956).
31 N.M. 641, 149 P. 1074 (1926).
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junction was sought, and relied on both in determining that the
plaintiffs were without standing. In spite of finding that the plaintiffs
had no standing, the court went on to hear and decide the case. The
court explicitly exercised its "absolute discretion" to decide a
question "of great public interest" because "we would be remiss in
our duty to the public, as well as to the relators, if we did not decide
the basic question."' I The court allowed the relators to vindicate
the public interest even though the court concluded that the relators
did not have standing as of right. The court made it clear that it can
exercise its discretion to hear a case on its merits where the complainant is without standing whether it be an original mandamus
proceeding or a request for an injunction if it is a question of "great
public importance." ' 6 The relators in this original mandamus action
sought to require the governor and eleven state agencies to return
their offices to the capitol city of Santa Fe.
In the 1968 case of Castillo v. N.M. State Tax Commission, the
court granted standing in an original mandamus action without
weighing the long-established requirements for standing because "this
case involves a question of such unusually great public interest that
we feel called upon to exercise the discretion vested in us to determine the issue." 6 7
The plaintiff, a taxpayer and owner-operator of an apartment
complex, in behalf of himself and other similarly situated ad valorem
taxpayers, sought to compel the defendant to provide a uniform
assessment percentage ratio for use in all counties for ad valorem
taxes. The plaintiff had asked the Attorney General to bring the
action, but the Attorney General declined. The court thus gave
standing to a taxpayer in the face of a long line of cases, including
the leader of them all, Asplund v. Hannett, which specifically deny
standing to taxpayers qua taxpayers. But the court was granting
standing because the question was one of "great public interest," not
because the plaintiff was a taxpayer. The court in exercising its
discretion said, "In doing so, we are not unmindful of, nor do we in
any sense overrule, our many decisions in which we refused to permit
a taxpayer to raise constitutional questions against state officials." 6 I
In the Castillo case the court noted that it has been "suggested
that a distinction should be made between the original jurisdiction of
65. State ex rel. Gomex v. Campbell, 75 N.M. 86, 92, 400 P.2d at 960.
66. Id.
67. 79 N.M. 357, 359, 443 P.2d 850, 852 (1968).
68. Id. The court here did not distinguish between cases where the taxpayer was challenging the expenditure of public funds as was the case in Asplund v. Hannett which will be
discussed later and cases where a taxpayer was challenging a tax assessment scheme.
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the Supreme Court [mandamus] and the jurisdiction of a district
court where injunction was sought. ' 6 9 The court carefully used the
words "suggested" and "should" rather than "there is a distinction";
the court quite clearly granted standing without making such a
distinction between its original jurisdiction and district court jurisdiction, simply because it believed the case involved a question of
great public importance.
The court was wise in not making a distinction for, as Professor
Jaffee says, "relief should not depend on whether the required relief
is an order to act (mandamus) or an order to refrain from action
(injunction). Where both remedies are available, it is merely elegantia
juris which dictates the appropriate form.'o
There is no indication that the New Mexico court is restricted
exercising its "absolute discretion" to grant standing to proceedings
involving its original jurisdiction. It consciously avoided placing such
a limitation on itself in the Castillo opinion, and in fact has exercised
or allowed the exercise of discretion in similar cases discussed below.
In 1934 in Crabtree v. Board of County Commissioners,7 the
court implicitly exercised its discretion and allowed a taxpayer to
challenge the sale of land even though there was no indication that
he had a direct personal interest.
In this case a taxpayer filed suit to cancel the sale of land for
$68,000 in a compromise sale of land by the State Tax Commission
in which $125,000 had been offered but rejected. The court, without
discussing standing, granted it to the taxpayer in spite of his not
having a direct, personal interest. In other words, they apparently in
their discretion felt the case was important enough to grant standing
to what in fact was a "private attorney general" to "vindicate the
public interest." Another interesting decision is the 1952 case of
Miller v. Cooper.72 There several taxpayers sought to prevent religious instruction in the Lindrith public schools. The court did not
discuss standing but granted access to the court. In so doing they
appear to have implicitly concluded it was a question of "public
interest" and exercised their discretion accordingly. Perhaps the
court did not directly discuss standing because the shadow of
Asplund v. Hannett7 3 lurked in the back of the court's mind, and
rather than confront it and wrestle with trying to distinguish it, they
chose simply to ignore it. Now that a viable theory has emerged from
the Castillo and Campbell cases, perhaps the court can more openly
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
L. Jaffee, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 485 (student ed. 1965).
38 N.M. 233, 31 P.2d 249 (1934).
56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952).
31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074 (1926).
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exercise its discretion in questions it considers to be important and
candidly give it reasons for doing so.
In a number of cases in which the complainant has sought to
enforce the New Mexico Constitution the New Mexico' court has,
without calling the complainant a private attorney general, granted
him standing to vindicate the public interest even though he had not
been personally injured in fact.
In 1936 in Baca v. Ortiz,7 4 one James Baca was allowed to enjoin
the County Clerk of Santa Fe County from carrying out the
"absentee ballot" laws. He successfully claimed that the absentee
ballot was contrary to Section 1 of Article 7 of the New Mexico
Constitution which provided that a person to be a qualified voter
must have "resided in New Mexico twelve months." The court
neither raised nor discussed the question of standing.
The year following Baca v. Ortiz, in another electoral question, the
court granted standing in mandamus proceedings to the plaintiff in
the Hutchison case.
In State ex rel. Gomez v. Campbell, the court exercised its discretion even though it noted that unlike Hutchison, "There is no question in this case relating to the elective franchise. . . ." ' They thus
made quite clear that their concept of important questions was not
limited to electoral cases, and that the exercise of their discretion to
grant standing to private attorneys general would range far wider as
defined by the public interest. This case did in fact involve "a problem of constitutional construction.' 6
The Asplund v. Hannett decision states there is not "an individual
right to prevent violation of the constitution." 7" This has troubled
the court, and its reasoning sometimes in distinguishing Asplund to
grant standing in a case it felt to be important has been something
less than an example of clarity. 7 8
But with the Castillo and Campbell cases the court firmly established that although a private party may not have standing to enforce
the constitution as a matter of right, it may in its discretion grant
standing to private individuals to vindicate the public interest in cases
raising questions which are of sufficient "public interest." 7
74. 40 N.M. 435, 61 P.2d 320 (1936).
75. 75 N.M. 86, 91, 400 P.2d 956,959 (1965).
76. Id
77. 31 N.M. 641, 645, 249 P. 1074 (1926).
78. In Shipley v. Smith, the court reflects the general confusion when it says: "It appears
.the trial judge ...was misled" by what the court said in Asplund. But the court itself
seems no more certain of the meaning of Asplund when in the very next paragraph it
somewhat tentatively deduces that "it appears that we did not decide that .... 45 N.M. 23,
25, 107 P.2d 1050, 1051 (1940).
79. State ex tel. Gomez v. Campbell, 75 N.M. 86, 91,400 P.2d 956, 960 (1965).
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This position is quite clearly compatible with Asplund v. Hlannett
which quoted an earlier decision with approval: "It is not the duty of
this court

.

.

.

or any other court ...

[to grant standing] except

when the question is presented by a litigant claiming to be adversely
affected. ... "8 0 This is simply another way of saying that one who

is not personally injured in fact is not entitled to standing as of right
to enforce the Constitution. The court, although not obligated, may
in its discretion grant standing if it determines the question is sufficiently significant.
PUBLIC REPRESENTATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
Recent federal decisions in which environmental groups attempted
to challenge governmental actions raise the question of how the
standing issue would be decided in such cases in New Mexico.
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Society Conference v. F.P.C.,8 ' the
Conference, an unincorporated conservation association, asked the
court to set aside an order of the F.P.C. granting a permit to erect a
power plant on the grounds that the F.P.C. had not satisfied its
statutory duty to consider the impact of the power plant on the
environment. The court held that the Conference had standing,
saying, "Those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a
special interest in such areas must be in the class of 'aggrieved
parties' " under the statute.8 2 The court also observed that Scenic
Hudson had an economic interest in that one of the members of the
Conference, the New York-New Jersey Trail Conference, had 17
miles of trail which would be flooded by the project.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 8 3 standing was
granted to the citizen group seeking to prevent construction of a
highway through a park. In Sierra Club v. Morton,"4 the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in denying standing to
enjoin the Departments of Agriculture and Interior from "taking any
action whatsoever toward implementing. ... "'

a development plan

which would allow private developers to construct a commercial
recreational area in a government-owned national forest and game
80.
81.
82.
83.

Asplund v. Alarid, 29 N.M. 129, 219 P. 786 (1923).
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 616.
309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

See also Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.

1967); Parker v. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970).
84. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cit. 1970), cert. granted sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 401 U.S.
907 (1971). See also Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.

1971).

85. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cit.
1970), cert. granted sub nor. Sierra Club v. Morton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971).
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refuge adjoining Sequoia National Park. The government had given
preliminary approval to a plan submitted by Walt Disney Productions.
Disney's proposal includes a village incorporating major hotels and
lodges for over 3,000 overnight guests, ten restaurants, a chapel,
theater, general store, five story parking facility, hospital and sewage
treatment facilities. Other facilities would include power plants, and
associated installations, swimming and ice skating facilities, twenty
ski lifts, a cog assisted railroad, avalanch dams and stream control
features, and a development scheme which would require 'extensive
bulldozing and blasting in most lower areas and extensive rock
removal8at high elevations and the grooming and manicuring of most

slopes.", 6

The Supreme Court emphasized that the Sierra Club failed to allege
individualized injury and observed that "nowhere in the pleadings... did the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any

purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be significandy affected..

." " The Court went on to observe that, "Cer-

tainly [the Sierra Club] has an 'interest' in the sense that the
proposed course of action . . . does not please its officers.... [However] We do not believe such club concern without a

showing of more direct interest can constitute standing in the legal
sense .. ."88 The Court distinguished between litigants whose
aesthetic appreciation is directly affected and an organization which
seeks to protect aesthetic and recreational values all over the nation,
but which does not assert that any of its members are directly
affected by the governmental action. If the pleadings of the Sierra
Club had asserted a more direct personal interest in fact of its local
California members, rather than an abstract national interest in recreational areas, it would seem the result might have been different.
The New MexicG requirement of a "direct personal interest"
indicates that the New Mexico court would follow the Sierra Club
decision and deny standing to a representative organization which
asserts only an abstract interest in the challenged action. However, if
the Club could show that some of its members actually used the area
in New Mexico the New Mexico requirement of a direct personal
interest would be satisfied even though the interest injured might be
small as was the 25 cent fee in Johnson v. Greiner,8 or was esthetic
rather than economic. The economic interest of flooded trails in
86. Id. at 7.
87. 92 S. Ct. 1361, 1366 (1972).

88. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1970).
89. 44 N.M. 230, 101 P.2d 183 (1940).
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Scenic Hudson likewise would be a direct personal interest and
would satisfy that aspect of New Mexico's standing requirements.
Thus, in New Mexico the requirement of a direct personal interest
would deny standing where the public representative has no more
than an abstract interest, unless the court determines that the question is one of great public interest and exercises its discretionary
power to grant standing.9 0 Also, the New Mexico requirement of an
invasion of a legal right is less predictable and in some situations
might pose an obstacle to standing in environmental litigations.
The question of what criteria are to be used to determine who is
qualified to represent the public interest inevitably will be a contested issue. In Scenic Hudson the court said, "Those who by their
activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such
areas . ."91 were qualified.
The Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton adds that "it is clear
that an organization whose members are injured may represent those
members in a proceeding for judicial review. But a mere 'interest in a
problem,' no matter how long standing the interest and no matter
how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not
sufficient by itself. ."9 2 to qualify the organization for standing.

TAXPAYER SUITS CHALLENGING EXPENDITURES OF FUNDS
The federal law formerly was very restrictive and has now been
significantly liberalized in challenges of public expenditures. Under
the 1923 case of Frothingharnv. Mellon,9 the federal courts turned
a cold shoulder on attempts by federal taxpayers to challenge expenditures of public funds. In that case the court held that the
taxpayer did not have standing because he did not have enough
personal interest since the effect of a federal expenditure on a federal
taxpayer was de minimus-in the court's words, "comparatively
minute and indeterminable." 9 4
• The federal law of standing has now been broadened significantly
by Flast v. Cohen9
which held that a federal taxpayer does have
standing to challenge a federal expenditure if he brings his claim
under a specific constitutional limitation on "the congressional
taxing and spending power." 9 6 In Flast seven plaintiffs successfully
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See discussion at note 58 supra.
354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
92 S.d. 1361, 1368 (1972).
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
Id. at 487.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
See Davis, supra note 2, at 601.
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sought standing "solely on their status as federal taxpayers" 9" to
challenge the expenditure of federal funds for religious schools in
contravention of the first amendment. State courts have long been
fairly liberal in giving taxpayers standing to challenge state expenditures, 98 but New Mexico, contrary to most, 9 9 has rebuffed taxpayers seeking to challenge public expenditures of state funds.
Again the granddaddy of New Mexico decisions on standing,
Asplund v. Hannett, looms large. In that case the court denied
standing to a taxpayer attempting to prevent expenditures from a
public fund established to build irrigation reservoirs. The Asplund
court unequivocally expressed itself: "Not having found any legal or
logical, principle to support a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the expenditure of state funds, we are constrained to hold that he has no right in
this state."' ° The court in the Castillo' ' case, decided after
Cohen v. Flast, specifically stated, "nor do we in any sense overrule"
Asplund in spite of their recognition that "the trend, and probably
the weight of authority ...

generally permit taxpayer suits as is

exemplified by ...Flast. 0 2 In Asplund v. Hannett the New Mexico
court sounded much like the U.S. Supreme Court in Frothinghamv.
Mellon.' 03 The court was just not convinced that the alleged injury
was anything but de minimus, even assuming the expenditure would
result in increased taxes. The New Mexico Supreme Court said,
"Though ...he [the taxpayer] contributes to the expense of government ... in the form of taxes.., it is not satisfactorily shown that

he will be in any way affected in his property by the proposed
expenditures."' 04
It should be noted that in the very case in which the court went
out of its way to say we do not in "any sense overrule" Asplund it
also "exercised the discretion visited in us" to grant standing because
the question was of such "unusually great importance."' 05 How97. 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
98. See Jaffee, supra note 70, at 471.
99. "Only two states-New York and New Mexico-squarely prohibit" such actions. Id.
100. The Asplund court specifically noted that taxpayers have standing in New Mexico
to challenge expenditure of municipal funds: "Whatever the merits of this doctrine ...we
consider the taxpayer's right, as against municipal authorities, settled in this jurisdiction."
Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 611, 651 (1926). But they saw this only as an exception to the
rule as enunciated by the court regarding state funds. An exception which they said with a
slight note of derision "is perhaps better supported by practical considerations than on
principle."Id at 664.
101. 79 N.M. 357, 359, 443 P.2d 850, 852 (1968).
102. Id. at 359, 443 P.2d at 852.
103. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
104. 31 N.M. 641, 650-51, 249 P. 1074, 1077 (1926).
105. Castillo v. N.M. State Tax Commission, 79 N.M. 357, 359, 443 P.2d 850 (1968).
See also Womack v. Regents of The University of New Mexico, 82 N.M. 460, 483 P.2d 934

(1970).
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ever, it in turn should be noted that Castillo did not involve a public
expenditure; rather it concerned a taxpayer attempting to compel
the State Tax Commission to establish a uniform tax assessment
ratio.
One may pose the question of what the court would do if a Cohen
v. Flast situation arises in New Mexico in the future. Will the court
slavishly follow Asplund? Will it follow Flast? Or will it follow
Castillo? In spite of the court's using absolute language in Asplund
saying that a citizen has no "right to prevent the violation of the
constitution"' 06 the question at issue did not involve a preferred
right of the Bill of Rights' o" or even a provision of the main body of
the constitution. It concerned the enabling legislation passed by
Congress and made a part of the New Mexico Constitution when
New Mexico became a state.' 08 Therefore, one has good reason to
doubt the monolithic character of the Asplund decision. If the question raised were one of racial discrimination or of interference with
freedom of speech, religion or privacy, there is little doubt that the
court would follow Castillo,'09 and in its discretion grant standing
because of the importance of the question.
Would the court go a step further and follow Flast by granting
standing as of right to challenge a public expenditure under specific
constitutional limitations on the power to tax and spend?
The New Mexico position in view of Castillo is both broader and
narrower than Flast. It is narrower than Flast in that, where the
challenge is based on a constitutional claim, standing is still a matter
of judicial discretion and not of right. On the other hand, Castillo is
broader than Flast in that standing can be granted in the court's
discretion even if a constitutional claim is not made. The question
need only be one of public importance. Therefore, in our hypothetical, there is no doubt that the New Mexico court would and
should grant standing. Should the court overrule Asplund and bring
New Mexico law into conformity with Fiast? This question is speculative at best; it will depend on how liberally the court exercises its
discretionary powers. Based on the assumption that the New Mexico
106. 31 N.M. 641, 645, 249 P.1074, 1075 (1926).
107. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); U.S. v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n. 4 (1938). See also the discussion in W. Dodd, Cases
on Constitutional Law 51 (1954).
108. Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 643, 249 P. 1074 (1926). See also Note, 4
Natural Resources J.156 (1964).
109. Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952), lends support, although it was
not framed in terms of stopping a particular public expenditure. In this case, the courts
granted access to a group of taxpayers seeking to bar permanently the teaching of religion in
public schools. Constitutional questions involving separation of church and state are important questions, the court thought so, and undoubtedly would in a Flast situation as well.
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court will consider substantial constitutional challenges to be important questions and grant standing, it would appear that the New
Mexico taxpayer under Castillo is in a better position to make legitimate challenges of public expenditures of state funds than the
federal taxpayer is under Flast.
EVALUATION OF NEW MEXICO LAW OF STANDING
The then Judge Burger once said, "The concept of standing is a
practical and functional one designed to insure that only those with a
10
genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding."'
Against this standard, how does one assess the New Mexico position?
Is it practical and functional, or does it unduly prevent those who
have "a genuine and legitimate interest" from challenging government actions?
In the appraisal of the New Mexico law of standing, there needs to
be some clarification which would make it both more practical and
functional, but there are credits as well as debits on the New Mexico
balance sheet.
A. Standing to challenge governmental actions other than those of
public expenditures of state funds:
The New Mexico law, particularly in the case of economic competitors, still appears tied to the pre-Data Processing language of
Tennessee Electric. Data Processing might be adopted without expressly overruling New Mexico precedents; a liberal reading of the
New Mexico precedents might argue that the New Mexico law is at
least not inconsistent with Data Processingand the court in Hubbard
did make a tentative movement toward adopting Data Processing.
However, it would be much better for the court to expressly and
clearly free itself from the Tennessee Electric language as expressed
in Ruidoso State Bank.
On balance the New Mexico law in this area is inadequate; it
unduly prevents those who have "a genuine and legitimate interest"
from challenging governmental actions other than public expenditures; but on the plus side, the power of the court to exercise its
discretion to grant standing "to vindicate the public interest" in cases
of "general and common interest" as enunciated in the Castillo and
Campbell cases ameliorates the New Mexico situation.
B. Taxpayer Challenges to Expenditures of State Funds:
Asplund v. Hannett looms large here in not recognizing standing in
110. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
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these cases. However, the Castillo doctrine which permits the court
to exercise its discretion to grant standing in important cases has the
potential for being superior to the federal Flast v. Cohen position in
that standing can be granted not only where specific constitutional
provisions limiting the spending power are at issue, but also where
any other important question (constitutional or nonconstitutional) is
involved.
However, there is still room for improvement. Simple justice requires that those who are injured by unlawful governmental action
should be allowed to seek judicial remedy: "Justice is enhanced in
that those who are hurt in fact are not barred by lack of standing
from having their cases decided on the merits,"' ' and it is hard to
disagree with Professor Davis' straightforward suggestion that "the
law should presume that every taxpayer is adversely affected by an
illegal public expenditure." '1 2
The best rule would grant standing to taxpayers if they could
persuade the court that a particular public disbursement was
arguably illegal. Then the case could be properly decided on its
merits. This requirement of an arguable claim at the threshold stage
would be both "practical and functional" in preventing the disruption of the processes of government by the perfidious taxpayer with
a capricious claim, while at the same time allowing standing when the
public has a "genuine and legitimate interest." No one would seem to
have a more genuine and legitimate interest in public expenditures
than a taxpayer.
New Mexico already allows taxpayers such standing to challenge
local governmental expenditures,' '3 and the reported cases bear
witness to the fact that the courts have not been inundated by taxpayer suits, nor is there any indication that the wheels of local
government have been unduly inhibited.
We are told that "only two states-New York and New Mexicosquarely prohibit"' 14 taxpayer standing to challenge state expenditures. Again, experience in other states would indicate that neither
the halls of justice nor the machinery of government are likely to be
overly burdened by allowing taxpayers to challenge illegal state
expenditures.' 1 S New Mexico should join the great majority of the
states in allowing such suits. Justice and public confidence in government would both be served.
111. Davis, supra note 2, at 618.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
See discussion at note 100 supra.
St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15 (1963).
Id. at 17. Note, Taxpayers'Suits, 69 Yale L.J. 895, 902 (1960).

July 1972]

LAW OF STANDING IN NEW MEXICO

BEYOND DATA PROCESSING: THE NEW MEXICO OPPORTUNITY
FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT

At this juncture in the development of the law of standing in New
Mexico when it is possible to say that there might be at least some
general compatibility between the New Mexico and Data Processing
positions, it is appropriate to question whether we should adopt the
formulation of Data Processing. There is appeal in following Data
Processing because it could potentially open the doors to standing in
many economic competition cases such as the Hubbard and Ruidoso
State Bank cases where the New Mexico court has been shackled by
inadequate doctrines. It would be a gain to carry forward and build
on the tentative step taken toward Data Processing by the New
Mexico court in the Hubbard decision. However, it would be much
better if the court did not take to its bosom the exact language of
Data Processing. Instead the opportunity should be grasped to
embrace a less complicated approach. The inquiry into standing
should focus on two things: (1) the question of whether the party
was injured in fact, or imminently threatened with injury by governmental action, economically or otherwise, and (2) the question of
whether the governmental action causing or threatening the injury
was arguably contrary to law or equity.
This borrows directly from Data Processing and New Mexico
precedent on the first requirement, but avoids the pitfalls of the
complex, confusing and litigation-prone language of the second Data
Processing requirement. The crux question in standing determinations is who has "a genuine and legitimate interest" in participating
in the proceedings. Certainly one who is injured, or imminently
threatened with injury, economically or otherwise, has a "genuine
interest." For it to be legitimate for standing purposes, the party
should also persuade the court that the action causing the injury is
arguably unlawful. Who has a more "genuine" interest than the one
injured by the governmental action? Yet even one who is injured
should not be allowed to hold up government action unless he can
reasonably argue that the action is contrary to law or equity in that,
for example, the agency has followed incorrect procedures, acted
ultra vires, contrary to statutory or constitutional strictures, or
equitable or common law principles.
Otherwise, anyone who disagreed with the rerouting of a highway
or discontinuance of a busline could fetter the power of public officials to act. Surely it is reasonable to require that the person
seeking standing not only demonstrate that he has suffered or is
imminently threatened with some injury, but also that the govern-
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mental act causing the injury was arguably contrary to law. The word
"arguably" is borrowed from Data Processingand indicates the threshold nature of the standing decision. Whether in fact the governmental action was contrary to law is the question which should be
determined after argument on the merits.
In the competition cases simple injury such as loss of profits
would not be enough, but if such economic injury is threatened or
caused by governmental action which is arguably contrary to law,
then the person so injured should havestanding. This approach.requires a direct personal interest on the part of the complainant,
satisfying the case or controversy consideration and avoids capricious
claims by forcing the complainant to persuade the court at an initial
stage that he has an arguable position.
If a person injured by arguably unlawful government action does
not have standing to raise the question in the courts, who does? As
the federal court in the federal contract case of Scanivell Laboratories v. Shaffer' 1 6 said, "If there is arbitrary, capricious
action ... who is going to complain about it, if not the party denied
a contract as a result of alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that it
will be a very healthy check on governmental action to allow such
suits. .. .'"' '7 The idea of the courts acting as guardians of the law is
fundamental to our legal system and administrative process. It goes
to the very foundation of checks and balances. This approach involves a subtle but important change from focusing on the interest
protected to focusing on the alleged unlawful governmental action in
standing inquiries. This would provide "a very healthy" posture in
standing determinations.
This approach not only is healthier from the checks and balances
point of view, but avoids the complexities of the second of the Data
Processing criteria which Davis calls "cumbersome, inconvenient and
artificial."' 1 8 Davis persuasively demonstrates that the second leg of
Data Processing does not bear close scrutiny. This second requirement provides that, in addition to injury in fact, the interest of the
one who is injured must be "arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
This formulation would restrict the interests "to be protected" to
those expressed in statutory or constitutional provisions, and would
exclude the traditional function of judges fashioning new tools to
meet changing conditions and needs through the common law
development of new doctrines, principles, new rights and remedies.
116. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
117. Id. at 866.
118. Davis, supra note 3, at 462.
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Davis uses American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty' '9
as an illustration. The Postmaster General issued a fraud order against
the school. The court granted the school access to the court to
challenge the governmental action and accepted its contention that it
was not engaging in fraud. The court spoke of "irreparable harm"
and acted on principles of equity to protect the school, not on
protection to be found in a zone of interests in a statute since "the
statute said nothing directly or indirectly about interests 'to be protected' . . . of course, it did not provide that one not engaging in
fraud was 'to be regulated.' "' 2 0

The second part of this test dealing with whether the interest is
within the zone "to be regulated" also raises unnecessary and undesirable impediments to standing. For example, if the State Highway Commission imposed dry cleaning standards upon Corrales,
Rapido Dry Cleaners, surely the owner of Rapido should have
standing to challenge the Highway Commission's action. However, a
thorough search of the New Mexico Constitution and the New
Mexico Statutes Annotated would nowhere reveal that Rapido was
"to be regulated" by the Highway Commission, and therefore should
have standing to challenge the restrictions based on the zone of
interests formula.' 2 ' The potential of the second of the Data Processing criteria for this sort of litigation generating confusion is great.
As Davis succinctly says: "Complexities about standing are barriers
to justice."11 22

Under the criteria proposed here the court need only determine
whether Rapido was injured in fact or imminently threatened with
injury, and whether the Highway Commission's action was arguably
unlawful. Since the action was (to say the least) arguably not authorized either by statute or constitution, they seemingly were not acting
within their authorized powers, and Rapido should clearly have
standing to challenge the governmental action.
The result might be different but the approach would be the same
in the Hubbard case; the court would simply inquire whether
Hubbard was in fact injured or imminently threatened with injury by
the governmental act, and secondly whether Hubbard reasonably
demonstrated that those acts were arguably unlawful; did the city of
Albuquerque act within its powers, or did it follow lawful procedures?
In contract cases in which it might be alleged that the government
119.
120.
121.
122.

187 U.S. 94 (1902).
Davis, supra note 3, at 459.
For a thorough discussion, see Davis, supra note 3, at 458.
Davis, supra note 3, at 473.
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agency, contrary to lawful procedures, chooses a bidder other than
the lowest bidder, who has a more "genuine and legitimate" interest
than the unrequited lowest bidder? Yet, under the Data Processing
criteria, one might not without considerable stretching of the statutory language find that the interest of the lowest bidders was within
a zone of interests "to be protected or to be regulated." The prime
concern of this type of situation will be to protect the interests of
the public, but who will have enough of a direct personal interest to
have standing if not the directly interested lowest bidder? Under the
simpler proposed test, the court can straightforwardly direct its
attention to whether the allegation by the economically injured
unsuccessful bidder that the government action was unlawful is a
reasonably arguable contention.
This allows the court to immediately get to the central question of
such challenges by persons injured or threatened with injury by
government actions-did the action of the government arguably
violate the law? Surely this would be a "practical and functional"
approach and in Judge Burger's words limit standing to "those with a
genuine and legitimate interest."
Scanwell Laboratoriesv. Shaffer' 2 3 was in fact a case in which a
non-successful bidder was allowed standing to challenge the decision
of the Federal Aviation Authority on the basis that it was contrary
to the relevant regulations. The court went directly to the important
question-the lawfulness of the governmental action. In so doing it
put its finger on the essence of the public interest in such cases: "If
there is arbitrary and capricious action on the part of any contracting
official, who is going to complain about it, if not the party denied a
contract as a result of the alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that
it will be a very healthy check on governmental action.... - 24
The court here grasped an important insight which has not often
been perceived in standing cases-there is an important public interest in correcting public action which is contrary to the law. And
what could be a more "practical, functional" way to vindicate the
public interest than by granting standing to someone with a "direct
personal interest"-someone with a "genuine and legitimate interest," a person either injured in fact or imminently threatened with
injury by governmental action?
Another facet of the second criterion of Data Processing is the
difficulty in determining legislative intent. Did the legislature intend
the particular interest "to be protected" or "to be regulated?" Exercises in unearthing ambiguous legislative intent are almost always
123. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
124. Id. at 866. For a complete discussion, see Davis, supra note 3, at 462.
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difficult at best; this is particularly so in New Mexico where we do
not have the benefit of a legislative record. Rather than attempting
the quest for legislative intent regarding the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated, it would be much simpler to focus directly on
the basic question of the clarity of the legality of the contested
governmental action.
A further but important point is that the source of law to which
the court may look is much too restricted under the second of the
Data Processing criteria. The court should look not only to statutory
and constitutional law, but also to equity and the common law. As
Davis asks, "Is not the question of who should have access to the
courts more likely to be answered satisfactorily if a court is free to
decide on the basis of what it deems to be the needs of justice?" ' 2
The ordinary processes of common law development should not be
stifled in the critical threshold determination of standing. The scope
of the courts to flexibly respond to new needs and conditions in the
constructive development of common law and equity should not be
discouraged.
In Scanwell Laboratories'26 the court's decision was wisely based
on its judgment of the "arbitrary or capricious" action of the contracting official, not the language of the statute. In American School
of Magnetic Healing,7 the court righly looked to equity and the
court's own judgment of "irreparable damage" on the specific facts
before it, not to a statute which did not anticipate the particular
situation. Under the proposed standards for standing, the court could
look to the entire spectrum of law and equity in deciding whether
the governmental action in question was "arguably contrary to the
law or equity."
It seems that we in New Mexico, as well as those elsewhere, have
been seeing as if through a glass darkly for years. We have not perceived as clearly as we might that not only the injured party, but also
the public, has an interest in preventing public action contrary to the
law. What could be more "practical and functional" than giving the
party injured by the governmental action, the one with a "genuine
and legitimate" interest, standing to vindicate the public interest. In
so doing two birds are hit with the same stone; the "direct personal
interest" of the complainant, and the interest of the public in a
government under law are both vindicated, all without flooding the
courts.
The New Mexico law of standing has still not fully matured. The
125. Davis, supra note 3, at 465.
126. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
127. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
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array of decided cases does not present a sufficiently integrated set
of principles upon which to make the critical decision of standing. In
developing the law of standing, the courts have been working toward
an adequate formulation of principles, but have not yet been able to
satisfactorily articulate a formula that is simple. yet does not inundate the courts; one that is predictable yet does not inhibit the
exercise of judicial judgment on a case-by-case basis. What is needed
is a straightforward doctrine which is "practical and functional," and
"insures that only those with a genuine interest can participate in a
proceeding,"' 28 and which does not unreasonably inhibit judicial
discretion.
The approach suggested here would do that, and in so doing would
not be radically out of harmony with the main thrust of New Mexico
decisions to date. However, it would be best for the court to expressly and clearly free itself from some of the inadequate language
of earlier cases such as that found in Ruidoso State Bank. The adoption of this formulation would be a natural outgrowth of development over the years of the New Mexico law of standing on a case-bycase basis. The law of standing would be simplified and justice would
be better served.
A short statement of the New Mexico law of standing would read
as follows:
A. Challenges to Governmental Actions Other Than
Public Expenditures
To have standing the following must be satisfied:
The complainant must be one who either is injured in fact or imminently threatened, economically or otherwise, by the governmental action in question; and the governmental action causing or
threatening to cause the injury must be arguably contrary to law or
equity.
Of course the legislature may expressly deny standing to challenge
governmental action. For example the legislature may for policy
reasons want to exclude judicial intervention in some situations
where speedy settlements or decisions are necessary, and it generally
has the power to do so.
The burden to prove the injury in fact or imminently threatened
injury would be on the plaintiff or petitioner, as would the burden to
reasonably persuade the court that the governmental action is
arguably contrary to law. The burden would be on the defendant to
show a legislative intent to deny standing in particular situations.' 29
128. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002

(1966).

129. See Davis, supra note 53, at 438.
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However, in cases "of great public importance"' 1 0 the court in the
exercise of its discretion may additionally grant standing to persons
who may not have been directly or personally injured, but whom the
court considers appropriate to vindicate the public interest.
B. Taxpayer Challengesof Public Expenditures of
State Funds
A taxpayer has standing to challenge expenditures of state funds
only upon a showing that the expenditure in question is arguably
unlawful.
Such an approach would considerably clear the dark glass through
which we have perceived the New Mexico law of standing.

130. State ex rel. Gomez v. Campbell, 75 N.M. 86, 92, 400 P.2d 956, 960 (1965).

